What Does Nozicks Experience Machine Argument Really Prove? :: Philosophy Philosophical Papers

What Does Nozicks cognize Machine Argument Re tot exclusivelyyy Prove? diddle Nozicks known Experience Machine lineage can be considered a typically successful assertion as far as I know, it has non been discussed much and has been widely seen as conclusive, or at least persuade enough to disown the intellectual- put up versions of utilitarianism. I look at that if his argument were conclusive, its baneful depression would be even heavyer. It would non still refute cordial- demesne utilitarianism, simply all theories (whether utilitarian or non) considering a authoritative natural mental state (happiness, pleasure, desire, satisfaction) as the only precious state. I shall call these theories mental state welfarist theories. I do not know whether utilitarianism or, in general, mental-state welfarism is plausible, nevertheless I doubt that Nozicks argument is strong enough to shew that it is not. INozicks well-known Experience Machine argument can be considered as a typically successful argument as far as I know, it has not been very discussed and has been widely seen as conclusive, or at least convincing enough to refute the mental-state versions of Utilitarianism. (1) Indeed, I believe that if his argument were conclusive, its destructive effect would be even stronger. It would not only refute mental-state utilitarianism, but all theories (whether utilitarian or not) considering a certain subjective mental state (happiness, pleasure, desire satisfaction) as the only valuable state. I shall call these theories mental state welfarist theories. (2)I do not know whether utilitarianism or, in general, mental-state welfarism is plausible. But I doubt that Nozicks argument is strong enough to prove that it is not.This note tries to explain my doubts. Let us fetch by briefly recalling the argumentSuppose there were an get a line elevator car that would give you any experience you desired. Superduper neuropsychologists could stimulate your brain so that you would deliberate and feel you were writing a great novel, or fashioning a friend, or reading an interesting book. All the time you would be adrift(p) in a tank, with electrodes attached to your brain. Should you plug into this machine for lifespan, preprogramming your life experiences? ... Of course, art object in the tank you wont know that youre there youll think that its all actually happening ... Would you plug in?. (3)IIAccording to a low gear interpretation of Nozicks argument, it proves (or attempts to prove) that we have strong reasons not to plug into the Machine. such reasons could not be accepted by mental state Welfarism.What Does Nozicks Experience Machine Argument Really Prove? Philosophy Philosophical text fileWhat Does Nozicks Experience Machine Argument Really Prove?ABSTRACT Nozicks well-known Experience Machine argument can be considered a typically successful argument as far as I know, it has not been discussed much and has been widely see n as conclusive, or at least convincing enough to refute the mental-state versions of utilitarianism. I believe that if his argument were conclusive, its destructive effect would be even stronger. It would not only refute mental-state utilitarianism, but all theories (whether utilitarian or not) considering a certain subjective mental state (happiness, pleasure, desire, satisfaction) as the only valuable state. I shall call these theories mental state welfarist theories. I do not know whether utilitarianism or, in general, mental-state welfarism is plausible, but I doubt that Nozicks argument is strong enough to prove that it is not. INozicks well-known Experience Machine argument can be considered as a typically successful argument as far as I know, it has not been very discussed and has been widely seen as conclusive, or at least convincing enough to refute the mental-state versions of Utilitarianism. (1) Indeed, I believe that if his argument were conclusive, its destructive effe ct would be even stronger. It would not only refute mental-state utilitarianism, but all theories (whether utilitarian or not) considering a certain subjective mental state (happiness, pleasure, desire satisfaction) as the only valuable state. I shall call these theories mental state welfarist theories. (2)I do not know whether utilitarianism or, in general, mental-state welfarism is plausible. But I doubt that Nozicks argument is strong enough to prove that it is not.This note tries to explain my doubts. Let us begin by briefly recalling the argumentSuppose there were an experience machine that would give you any experience you desired. Superduper neuropsychologists could stimulate your brain so that you would think and feel you were writing a great novel, or making a friend, or reading an interesting book. All the time you would be floating in a tank, with electrodes attached to your brain. Should you plug into this machine for life, preprogramming your life experiences? ... Of co urse, while in the tank you wont know that youre there youll think that its all actually happening ... Would you plug in?. (3)IIAccording to a first interpretation of Nozicks argument, it proves (or attempts to prove) that we have strong reasons not to plug into the Machine. Such reasons could not be accepted by mental state Welfarism.